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Summary findin  gs
Using new survey evidence, Dasgupta, Hettige, and  of environmental specialists, and assigning environmental
Wheeler analyze the effects of regulation, plant-level  tasks to general managers is more effective than using
management policies, and plant and firm characteristics  special environmental managers.
on environmental performance in Mexican factories.  Regulatory pressure works. Plants that have
They focus especially on management policies: the  experienced regulatory inspections and enforcement are
degree of effort to improve environmental performance  significantly cleaner than those that have not.
and the type of management strategy adopted.  Public scrutiny promotes stronger environmental
They index effort with two variables: adoption  of ISO  policies. Publicly traded Mexican firms are significantly
14000-type procedures for pollution management and  clearer than privately held firms.
use of plant personnel for environmental inspection and  Size matters. Large plants in multiplant firms are much
control.  Proxies for strategic orientation  are two indices  more likely to adopt policies that improve environmental
of mainstreaming: assigning environmental respon-  performance.
sibilities to general managers instead of specialized  OE,CD  influences do not matter. It is generally
environmental managers, and providing environmental  assurned that plants linked to OECD economies show
training for all plant employees, not just specialists.  superior environmental performance, but they find no
Detailed survey data let them test the performance  evidence that OECD links - including multinational
impact of such factors as ownership, scale, sector, trade  ownership, trade, management training, or management
and other business relationships, local regulatory  experience - affect environmental performance.
enforcement, local community pressure, management  New technology is not significantly cleaner. They find
education and experience, and workers' general  no evidence that plants with newer equipment perform
education. Their findings:  better environmentally (once other factors are accounted
Process  is important. Plants that institute ISO 14000-  for).
type internal management procedures show superior  Education promotes clean production. Plants with
environmental performance.  more highly educated workers show significantly better
Mainstreaming works. Environmental training for all  environmental management efforts and performance.
plant personnel is more effective than developing a cadre
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This paper uses new survey evidence to analyze  the effects of regulation, plant-level
management policies, and plant/firm characteristics on the environmental performance of
Mexican factories.  We focus particularly on management policies: the degree of effort to
improve environmental  performance, and the type of management strategy which is
adopted.  Effort is indexed by two variables: adoption of ISO 14000-type procedures for
pollution management, 1 and use of plant personnel for environmental inspection and
control.  Strategic orientation is proxied by two indices of 'mainstreaming:'  assignment of
environmental  responsibilities  to general managers, instead of specialized environmental
managers; and general environmental training for plant employees, as opposed to training
for specialists only.  Our detailed survey data also enable us to test the performance
impact of many other factors, including ownership, scale, sector, trade and other business
relationships, local regulatory enforcement, local community pressure, management
education and experience, and workers' general education.
Recognizing that plant-level management policies and environmental performance are
simultaneously  determined, the paper uses two-stage least squares for econometric
estimation. In the first-stage equations, the four management policy indices are regressed
on exogenous measures of regulation and the characteristics of plants, firms and markets.
The first-stage results are used to instrument the management indices in the second-stage
regression, which measures their impact on actual performance, along with the effects of
workers' education and the cost of pollution control.
The implications of our results can be summarized as follows:
(1) Process is important. Plants which institute ISO 14000-type internal management
procedures exhibit superior enviromnental  performance.
(2) Mainstreaming works. Environmental training for all plant personnel is more
effective than developing a cadre of environmental specialists;  assigning environmental
tasks to general managers is more effective than using special environmental managers.
(3) Regulatory pressure works.  Plants which have experienced regulatory inspections
and enforcement are significantly  cleaner than their counterparts.
(4) Public scrutiny promotes stronger environmental policies.  Publicly-traded
Mexican firms are significantly  cleaner than their privately-held counterparts
(5) Size matters.  Large plants in multi-plant firms are much more likely to adopt policies
which improve environmental performance.
(6) OECD influences don't matter. Analyses of pollution control in developing
countries generally assume that plants linked to the OECD economies have superior
environmental performance. However, we do not find a significant  role for any OECD
See  Appendix  2 for a description  of ISO 14000  environmental  management  standards.
ilinkage: multinational ownership, trade, management training, or management
experience.
(7) New technology isn't significantly cleaner. We find no evidence that plants with
newer equipment have better environmental performance, once other factors are
accounted for.
(8) Education promotes clean production. Plants with more highly-educated workers
have significantly  greater environmental management effort and better performance.
Our results have some interesting implications for the World Bank and other development
assistance institutions.  The significance  of our regulatory variables underscores the
importance of strengthened enforcement, which has been a traditional focus of technical
assistance projects.  Stricter enforcement raises theprice  ofpollution  and provides an
important incentive for pollution reduction.  However, our results also highlight the
potential of programs which promote more effective environmental management and
training within plants.  Such programs can increase the elcasticity  of industry's response to
regulation, and may in some cases provide very cost-effective complements to stricter
enforcement.
ii1. Introduction
Researchers in economics and management typically differ in their treatment of
management decisions. Assuming  that firms optimize with known production sets
(including management techniques), economists prefer to analyze responses to exogenous
changes in markets, regulations and other variables. The conventional, if generally
unspoken, view is that management practices are endogenous.  Some management
researchers, on the other hand, are comfortable with the assumption that managers have
incomplete knowledge of production sets and techniques for optimization. This
assumption validates empirical studies which relate management choices to differences in
profitability.
Although we are economists, we adopt the management research perspective in this paper
because the assumption of incomplete information seems appropriate.  For plant and firm
managers in developing countries, improved environmental performance implies
experimentation with new production sets. In Mexico, for example, serious environmental
regulation is largely a phenomenon of the 1990's. Both regulators and businesses are still
adjusting to the environmental  era, and there is considerable  uncertainty about the relative
effectiveness of alternative approaches to regulatory policy and plant-level environmental
management.
Using recent survey evidence from Mexico, this paper analyzes the relationships linking
management and environmental  performance in a large sample of industrial facilities. We
focus on two questions. First,  why does plant-level environmental performance in
developing countries vary so widely when regulation is weak?  Conventional  theory would
suggest little or no pollution control effort when the 'price of pollution' is very low.
However, many factories in developing countries have already adopted significant
pollution control measures. Recent work on industrial pollution in Asia has suggested the
importance of three factors: 2 formal regulation (where it exists); informal regulation,
or community pressure; and plant and firm characteristics  which affect both the cost of
abatement and the incentive to abate.  In Asia, the characteristics which best explain
variations in environmental performance are plant size (a plus, because of public visibility
and scale economies in,  abatement); government ownership (a distinct minus, because
government facilities are less efficient and typically shielded from formal or informal
regulatory pressure); and production sector (because of generic variations in process
technologies and abatement costs).  Contrary to the conventional view, this research has
not found any evidence  that multinational ownership has a significant  effect on
environmental performance. However, there is strong evidence  that local community
pressure (informal regulation) has an impact.
While the Asian results provide some initial insights, data limitations have prevented a
comprehensive analysis. Important but unanswered questions include:
2  See  Pargal and Wheeler,  1996; Hettige,  et. al., 1996;  Hartman,  et. al., 1996;  Wang and Wheeler,  1996.
11.  Are plants  with newer  equipment  more likely  to comiply  with regulations,  both because
newer  technologies  are cleaner  and because  end-of-pipe  abatement  is less  costly  for
plants  which  use newer  processes?
2.  Are plants  which  export heavily  to the OECD  affected  by environmentalist  concerns  in
their client  countries?
3.  Are plants  cleaner  if they  have  managers  whose  training  and/or  experience  has been in
OECD  countries?
4.  Are firms  whose shares  are publicly  traded  more sensitive  to environmental  issues,  and
more likely  to seek  improved  environmental  performance,  than privately-held  firms?
5.  Do scale  economnies  in pollution  control  originate  at the firm  level,  as well  as the plant
level?
6.  Do plants  with more  human  capital  control  pollution  more  effectively?
Our second  question  is: How do manufacturing  facilities  achieve  better environmental
performance?  We can address  this question  because  the Mexican  industry  survey  includes
detailed  questions  about environmental  management  and  training  practices. In the paper,
we investigate  interplant  differences  in these  practices  and their impact  on environmental
performance.
Our empirical  assessment  of internal  policies  recognizes  an inevitable  simultaneity
problem: Positive  correlations  between  superior  environrnental  performance  and  indices
of environmental  management  do not imply  causal  roles for the latter. Firms  will almost
certainly  change  their environmental  management  practices  when optimal  pollution
abatement  levels  are altered  by exogenous  changes  in regulations  or prices.
We use two-stage  least squares  to address  this simultaneity  problem. In the first-stage
equations,  we regress  internal  management  indices  on exogenous  determinants  of
pollution  control  activity. Our management  indices  captu:re  both relative  effort  to improve
performance  and the type of strategy  adopted  by the plant. Effort is indexed  by two
variables:  degree  of adoption  of ISO 14000-type  procedures  for pollution  management;
and expanded  use of plant  personnel  for environmental  inspection  and control. Strategic
orientation  is captured  by two measures  of 'mainstreaming'  environmental  concerns:
assignment  of environmental  responsibilities  to general  managers,  rather than specialized
environmental  managers;  and general  environmental  training  for plant  employees,  as
opposed  to training  focused  on environmental  specialists.
Our detailed  survey  data  enable  us to test the effect  of many  exogenous  factors  on
management  effort  and strategic  orientation.  These  include  plant and  firm scale,
ownership,  human  resource  quality,  trade relationships,  OECD  training  and experience  of
plant managers,  experience  of formal  regulation  in previous  years,  and degree  of informal
regulation  by local communities. The results  of the first-stage  equations  are, of course,
interesting  in themselves.  They  also enable  us to construct  instrumented  versions  of the
management  indices  for the second-stage  equation. The dependent  variable  in this
equation  is a measure  of compliance  with  Mexican  environmental  regulations.  Righthand
variables  include  the four instrumented  policy  indices,  a measure  of general  employee
2education,  and  proxies  for pollution  abatement  costs (sector,  scale  and technology
vintage).
We believe  that this two-stage  analysis  can provide  useful  information  for both public  and
private  managers  in developing  countries. For private  managers,  it can help  reduce
uncertainty  about  appropriate  strategies  for improving  environmental  performance. For
public  managers,  it can help  identify  the most important  sources  of leverage  to reduce
excessive  pollution. By identifying  effective  internal  management  options,  it may  also
suggest  new possibilities  for cost-effective  intervention.  Economists  have  traditionally
argued  that regulators  should  use market-based  instruments  whenever  possible,  leaving
industry  to determine  appropriate  ways of adjusting  to stricter  regulation. We support  this
proposition,  but our results suggest  a possible  extension:  By increasing  the elasticity of
firms' response  to new incentives,  appropriate  technical  assistance  for improved  internal
management  may  be a cost-effective  adjunct  to market-based  regulation.
The rest of the paper  is organized  as follows. Section  2 introduces  Mexico's pollution
control system,  and Section  3 describes  the survey  which  has been  used for our analysis.
The analytical  approach  and estimating  equations  are developed  in Section  4; results  are
discussed  in Section  5; and Section  6 explores  the implications  with a simulation  exercise.
Section  7 concludes  the paper.
2.  Industrial  Pollution  and Regulation  in Mexico
During  the past forty  years,  Mexico  has built one of the largest  industrial  economies  in the
developing  world. Until  recently,  however,  environmental  regulation  has received  scant
attention. The result  for Mexico  City  has been air pollution  which  is among  the worst in
the world,  and other cities  are also suffering  from excessive  pollution  (Hettige,  et. al.,
1996). Table  1 provides  recent  emissions  estimates  for Mexico's  urban  regions.
At the national  level, an institutional  response  to this  problem  began  in the late 1980's  and
has accelerated  during  the past few years. In its first  phase of development,  the national
regulatory  system  has had two prominent  characteristics:  an emphasis  on command-and-
control  regulation,  and a multi-institutional  approach  to monitoring  and enforcement.
Under  command-and-control  regulation,  the environmental  performance  of polluters  is
evaluated  according  to compliance  with numerous  licenses  and permits  issued  to each
plant.
3Table 1:  Pollution from Industrial Sources in Urban Mexico, 1994 (tons/year)
Pollution
Sources  TSPa  SO 2"  Coe  NOXd  HCe  Total
Total  6,345  143,024  1,161,231 203,142  313,060  145,508  1,965,965
Urban Area  ==  _
Tula-Vito-Apaxco  13  21,503  339,763  2,787  66,270  12,540  442,863
Manzanillo, Col.  11  18,881  207,045  2,292  52,296  414  280,928
Toluca-Lerma, Edo. MexL  67  13,704  203,170  2,006  42,779  1,274  262,933
Salamanca, Gto.  49  11,391  117,675 =3,565  21,930  4,073  158,634
Tijuana, B.C.  114  3,053  11,749  117,552  6,032  231  138,617
Coatzacoalcos-Minatitlan  78  9,944  5,818  25,053  35,125  58,479  134,419
Tampico-Altamira  14  5,876  66,323  824  8,876  30,660  112,559
ZMVM  4,623  6,358  26,051  8,693  31,520  33,099  105,721
Torre6n, Coah.  94  4,585  59,092  8,052  639  178  72,546
Monterrey, N.L.  85  9,724  22,360  2,164  8,375  115  42,738
La Paz, B.C.S.  25  3,038  31,128  =267  6,007  45  40,485
Merida, Yuc.  42  2,497  28,932  1,057  7,806  79  40,371
Cd. Juairez, Chih.  135  4,968  5,751  17,199  9,160  1,195  38,273
Guadalajara, Jal.  423  15,045  10,634  1,624  3,184  49  30,536
Other  cities  572,  12,457  25,740  10,007  13,061  3,077  64,342
a  b  c  d  e
Total Suspended  Particulates;  Sulfur  Dioxide;  Carbon  Monoxide; Nitrogen  Oxides; Hydrocarbons
Source: SEMARNAP
The second prominent characteristic of Mexican environmental management has been
multi-institutional  administration.  Different aspects of industrial pollution control have
been the responsibility  of different agencies within the Secretaria del Medio Ambiente,
Recursos Naturalesy Pesca (SEMARNAP).  The principal units are the Instituto
Nacional de Ecologia (INE), responsible  for monitoring air and toxic emissions;  Comisi6n
Nacional del Agua (CNA), with similar responsibility  for water emissions; and
Procuraduria Federal de Protecci6n al Ambiente (PROFE  PA), which is charged with
factory inspections and enforcement of all pollution regulations.  During the 1990's,
PROFEPA has expanded its activities from a few inspections per year to several thousand.
Mexican environmental  policy continues to evolve rapidly, reflecting rising consciousness
of pollution problems and Mexico's higher international profile (e.g., negotiations to enter
NAFTA and the OECD). In April 1997, President Zedillo introduced a new approach to
pollution control in Mexico, based in part on rapid development and implementation of the
Sistema Integrado de Regulaci6n Directa y Gesti6n Ambiental de la Industria (SIRG).
The SIRG is intended to promote Mexico's interest in bothL  international competitiveness
and strong environmental protection.  It will integrate regulation of emissions to air,
ground and water; stress cost-effective regulatory instruments; permit much broader
public access to environmental information; and operate from an integrated information
system which will employ all the data resources of SEMARNAP.
4For the purposes of this paper, two aspects of Mexico's recent pollution control
experience are most important.  First, the system is quite new.  Many Mexican factories
have not yet been inspected, although PROFEPA's activities are widely known.  Second,
business managers in Mexico now acknowledge that they will have to respond to stricter
environmental standards.  Our survey of Mexican industry therefore provides a snapshot
of an industrial system in transition. Faced with credible evidence of the government's
intent to regulate more strictly, Mexican firms have begun experimenting with new
approaches to environmental management and training.
3.  The National Survey of Industrial Polluters
The data used for this paper were produced by a large survey of Mexican manufacturers
carried out in the fall of 1995.  The survey focused on four sectors which are estimated to
generate between 75% and 95% of Mexico's total industrial pollution: Food, chemicals,
non-metallic  minerals, and metals.  Confidential, in-depth interviews were conducted at
236 facilities, chosen to represent Mexican factories in a set of categories defined by
sector, size class, and location. Tables 2 and 3 provide information on the distribution of
plants surveyed.  Summary information on other variables can be found in Appendix 1.
Table 2:  Sectoral and Size-Class Distribution of Plants Surveyed
Sizea/Sector  Food  Chemicals  Non-Metallic  Metals
Minerals
Large  21  18  12  20
Medium  22  21  12  18
Small  19  23  27  23
a Size classes are defined by employment ranges as follows:  Small (16 -100 employees);
Medium (100 -250 ); Large (250 +)
Table 3:  Regional and Sectoral Distribution of Plants Surveyed
Regiona/Sector  Food  Chemicals  Non-Metallic  Metals
Minerals
Medium City  21  20  18  21
Industry  19  20  9  21
Corridor  b  I  III
Large City  22  22  24  19
a An industrial area which extends between two urban regions
The survey was designed by a World Bank team which included the authors.  It was
conducted by the Monterrey Institute of Technology (MT),  with the explicit support of
Mexico's National Environment Ministry (SEMARNAP) and the Mexican National
Association of Industries. To minimize  reporting bias, the survey was conducted only after
agreement by all sponsors (the Government, the Bank and the Industries Association) that
5the MIT team would not reveal the identity of the plants surveyed or the respondents
within the plants.
The survey provides very detailed information about environmental performance and its
determinants, including plant, firm and market characteristics; sources of environmental
information; the quality and costliness of relationships with regulators; the cost of
pollution control; and the measures taken by plant management to improve performance.
Our analysis  relies solely on self-reported environmental performance, since we had no
access to independently-audited data on pollution and regulatory compliance. Is self-
assessed performance a credible measure? Useful evidence is provided by Table 4, which
summarizes the respondents' overall assessment of  their facilities' compliance with
Mexican regulations.
Table  4:  Self-Assessed  Environmental  Performance
Environmental  Performance  Number  % of
of Plants  Total
Excellent:  Far more than necessary for compliance  23  10
Good: Almost always in compliance  84  38
Fair:  Occasionally  compliant  99  44
Poor: Never in compliance  10  4
Very Poor: Far below compliance;  very damaging  8  4
With confidentiality  reasonably well-assured, 52% of survey respondents replied that their
plants were not in compliance with regulations.  Only 1  0%/o  rated their facilities as
Excellent, and approximately the same number as Poor or Very Poor.  We have no
benchmarks, so we can only make an educated guess about the degree of upward bias in
this self-assessment.  Suggestive evidence is provided by recent research on Indonesia, a
country with similar regulations but much weaker monitoring and enforcement.
Independent auditing of a large sample of Indonesian plants has shown that approximately
64% are non-compliant (Afsah, et. al., 1996), with 3% in the 'extremely damaging'
category.  This evidence suggests that the degree of upward bias in the Mexican self-
assessment may not be large.  In any case, our analysis  focuses on relative, not absolute,
performance. Independent assessment of conditions in the surveyed plants by the MIT
team indicated a high correlation between self-assessment  and observable conditions.
64.  Modeling Environmental Performance
In the short run, plant managers typically respond to stricter regulation with some
investment in end-of-pipe abatement equipment. They also begin a long-run process of
experimentation and adaptation, in which products and processes are re-assessed in the
search for new optimum arrangements.  Formally, this response can be captured by
extending the standard KLEM production frontier into a new dimension: 'use of
environmental services,' or pollution (P).  In the KLEMP model, stricter regulation
imposes a non-zero pollution price (either implicitly,  through enforcement of standards, or
explicitly,  through the collection of pollution charges or imposition of tradable permit
systems). Faced with a new set of relative input prices, profit-maximizing  firms reveal a
new set of input demand equations, including one for environmental demand. 3
The environmental demand function differs from the others in one important respect:  The
incremental cost of pollution to the firm is an expected value, not a set price. It is
influenced  by many variables, including stochastic enforcement actions, variable financial
penalties, reputational damage, and the uncertain cost of extensive negotiations with
regulators, local communities, and other environmental stakeholders. Plants and firms
with different characteristics will assess enforcement probabilities and expected costs in
different ways. Although much empirical  research remains to be done, economic logic
does suggest some hypotheses about the determinants of plant and firm responses.
Determinants of Environmental Effort
Scale: Improving environmental performance requires some fixed investmenit  and the
application of specialized skills.  Large facilities should therefore find it less costly at the
margin to undertake performance-improving  measures. At a higher organizational level,
the same argument should hold true for multi-plant firms: Specialized resources can be
spread over more units, allowing for more ambitious environmental initiatives.  Scale
should also work through the 'visibility effect' (see Pargal and Wheeler, 1996): Larger
polluters are more detectable by surrounding communities, and may well be under
stronger pressure to abate.  Thus, scale may increase the incentive to abate as well as the
elasticity of response.  Both factors should push factories toward more pollution control
effort.
Public Information: Recent research in North America, Latin America and Asia
(Laplante, et. al., 1994, 1997) has shown that environmental  performance affects stock
prices in both developed and developing countries.  Publicly-traded firms whose good
performance is publicized receive premia in the market; bad performers are discounted.
Since this provides an additional incentive to control pollution, we would expect publicly-
traded firms to have stronger environmental  management than their privately-held
counterparts.
3  For an extended  discussion  see Pargal and Wheeler  (1996).
7OECD Linkages: It is plausible to suppose that industrial facilities will have stronger
environmental management if they are linked to the OECD economies through ownership,
trade, and professional relationships. To minimize internal transactions costs,
multinationals  may use OECD-standard environmental  management practices in
developing countries.  The rapid growth of green labeling in North America and Western
Europe may pressure developing-country exporters toward greater environmental effort.
Local managers trained in OECD business or technical schools, or with OECD operations
experience, may adopt practices which reflect the environmental standards of their host
countries.
Education: More highly-educated  workers and managers should respond more efficiently
to new incentives, so we would expect more environmental effort from factories with
greater human resources.
Regulation: Since 1990, PROFEPA has rapidly expanded its inspection and enforcement
program. A significant  proportion of Mexican factories havre  now been inspected at least
once. In addition, local authorities have inspection and enforcement programs in some
urban areas.  Recent research for the U.S. (Magat and Viscusi, 1990) and Canada
(Laplante and  Rilstone, 1996) has suggested that inspections have a significant  impact on
environmental management, even in cases where factories are in formal compliance with
regulations. If the regulatory system is working in Mexico, we would expect to observe
the same impact.
Technology vintage:  More recent vintages (particularly imported equipment) should
reflect stricter environmental regulation by incorporating environment-saving  innovations.
In addition, end-of-pipe pollution abatement equipment is generally less costly to install
when it is combined with more recent technologies.  Since better environmental
performance should cost less in newer plants, we might expect to observe more
environmental effort in such facilities.
Sector:  Industry sectors vary significantly  in pollution intensity (pollution per unit of
output) because of differences  in abatement costs (Dasgupta, et. al., 1996; Hartman, et.
al., 1997). Faced with identical expected penalties for pollution, we would expect sectors
with lower abatement costs to exhibit greater environmental effort.
Management Options and Environmental Performance
Since Mexico has only recently entered the environmental era,  it does not seem realistic
to assume that Mexican firms are fully-informed  about the profitability of alternative
strategies for pollution control.  Under these conditions, we believe that new information
can be generated by studying the impact of management on environmental performance.
We use the survey information to define two indices of management effort in this context:
adoption of ISO 14000-type environmental management procedures; and expanded use of
personnel for environmental inspection and control.  To study the effect of alternative
strategies, we also define two indices of 'mainstreaming:' assignment of environmental
8responsibilities  to general managers, rather than specialized environmental managers; and
general environmental training for plant employees, as opposed to training focused on
environmental specialists.
The rationale for one of our effort indices seems clear: Expanded use of personnel for
environmental inspection and control reflects the standard logic of resource reallocation
when relative prices change. However, the other indices require more explanation.
ISO 14000 Sequence: Why should a 'workbook'  approach to environmental
management yield better performance? In general, workbook exercises will improve
overall understanding and performance only if they induce appropriate learning. In the
case of ISO 14000, the basic 'exercises' are defined as follows: 4
1.  An initial review by management to identify environmental issues of concern (e.g.
excessive use of polluting inputs; the potential for a serious environmental accident);
2.  Establishment of priorities for action, taking into account factors such as local
environmental regulations and potential costs;
3.  Establishment of an environmental policy statement, to be signed by the CEO;
4.  Development of performance targets based on the policy statement (e.g. reduction of
heavy metals emissions by 50% by some future date);
5.  Implementation of an environmental management system as part of reaching the
performance targets;
6.  Implementation review; performance measurement.
Following the ISO 14000 sequence will not, of course, guarantee any improvement in
environmental performance.  However, it seems likely that plants which complete these
steps will be informed, organized, and motivated in ways which distinguish  them from
other facilities. As Table 5 shows, the factories in our sample vary widely in their
adoption of such practices.
4  See  Appendix  2 for  a more  detailed  discussion.
9Table 5: Adoption of ISO 14000 Procedures
Adoption  Number  Percent
Score  of
Plants
S￿  25  111  47.0
25 < S < 50  45  19.1
50 < S < 75  38  16.1
75s<S100  42  17.8
Mainstreaming vs. Specialization:  From a theoretical perspective, neither
mainstreaming nor specialization is clearly optimal under all conditions. The argument for
specialized training and management seems strongest for cases where environmental
problems are technically complex, concentrated at a few points, and separated from
standard production processes.  However, in real-world cases this potential advantage
may never be greater than the benefits from mainstrearming.  Table 6 shows that our
sample plants are pursuing different options:  Only 6% have specialized environmental
managers, while 67% have specialized environmental training.  It is possible to reconcile
these data with a model of optimization, but it seems m,ore  plausible to regard Table 6 as a
snapshot of experimentation in a transitional era.  We will return to this issue in our
discussion of the results.
Table 6:  Mainstreaming vs. Specialization
Yes  %  No  %
Environmental training for non-environmental workers'?  76  32.6  157  67.4
Environment manager also has other responsibilities?  211  93.8  14  6.2
Econometric Estimation
The first stage of our analysis attempts to identify the major determinants of environmental
effort and orientation toward mainstreaming. In four regressions, we test the relative
effects of sector, scale, ownership, OECD links, education, prior regulation, and
technology vintage.  The regressions are specified in the following variables:
MGT = f (SIZE, TECH, PUBLIC, MULTINAT, OEC:D, MEXICO, MULTIDIV,
EMPSEC, EMPHIGH, MGTSEC, OTHEXP, ENFORCE, RULES, INFORMAL,
CONVENIO,  FOOD,  CHEM,  METAL),
where the four MGT indices are defined as follows:
10EMS:  Steps completed in ISO 14000 Environmental Management
System development (See Appendix 2)
LABOR:  Significant  assignment of workers to environmental work? (1 if yes)
MGT:  Environmental manager also assigned to other work? (1 if yes)
TRAINING:  Is environmental training given to non-environmental  workers?
(1 if yes)
The righthand variables are:
SIZE:  Sequential categorical variable (1 if employment 16-100;
2 if 100-250; 3 if greater than 250)
TECH:  Proportion of equipment acquired since 1990
PUBLIC:  Proportion of the firm which is publicly  traded
MULTINAT: Dummy variable (1 if multinational; 0 otherwise)
OECD:  Share of plant's shipments  going to OECD countries
MEXICO:  Share of plant's shipments going to Mexican destinations
MULTII)IV: Whether the plant is part of a multidivisional  firm (1 if yes)
EMPSEC:  Proportion of employees with secondary school education
EMPHIGH:  Proportion of employees with post-secondary education
MGTSEC:  Is secondary education the highest attained by the plant's senior
manager? (1 if yes)
OTHEXP:  Has the plant's senior manager had education or experience
abroad? (1 if yes)
ENFORCE:  Has the plant been subject to a regulatory inspection? (1 if yes)
RULES:  Degree of influence  of regulatory policies (0 (None) to 5 (High))
INFORMAL: Degree of influence  of neighbors and community
(0 (None) to 5 (High))
CONVENIO:  Has the plant signed an environmental convenio with the local
community?  (1 if yes)
FOOD, CHEM, METAL: Dummy variables for the Food, Chemical and Metals
sectors.
Our second-stage analysis  studies the relative impact of environmental effort and
mainstreaming on environmental performance. A priori, we would expect better
performance in plants which use more personnel for environmental  monitoring and
inspection. However, we are agnostic about whether adherence to a set of environmental
management routines can, in itself, produce better performance. We have good
information about the degree to which plants have implemented  ISO 14000-type
procedures, so we are able to test this proposition directly.
We are also interested in the impact of alternative strategies for training and assignment of
responsibilities  for environmental  management. We use our information  to investigate two
questions about mainstreaming: First, for equivalent resources, is environmental
performance improved more by training a specialized cadre of environmental workers, or
by spreading the training resources across all workers?  Second, is it better to assign
11managers to the specialized task of environmental improvement, or is it better for line
managers to assume environmental management as one of several tasks?  In each case, it
is possible to construct arguments for and against these propositions.  In the second-stage
analysis, we estimate a probit equation which relates self-assessed compliance with
environmental regulations to the four management indices, general worker education, and
proxies for abatement costs.  The four management policy variables (EMS, LABOR,
MGT, TRAINING) are instrumented using the first-stage results. The probit equation is
specified in the following variables:
COMPLY = f (EMS, LABOR, MGT, TRAINING, EMPHIIGH,  SIZE, TECH,
FOOD, CDEM, METAL)




Table 7 provides a summary of the first-stage estimates. We have included only variables
which are significant  at conventional confidence levels. Our most striking result is a
negative one: Most of the variables with some plausible claim to influence on environment
effort have no significant  effect.  These include all variables indexing OECD linkages
(through ownership, trade, training or management experience), technology vintage, and
indirect community pressure (other than through formal regulatory actions).
The absence of any significance  for foreign ties contradicts the conventional wisdom, but
it is consistent with results which we have obtained from analyses of plant-level
environmental performance in Asia. We also find no significant differences for factories
with more modem technology.  This first-stage result has no strong implication  for
ultimate environmental performance: Modern technology might actually induce less
environmental effort, if modem plants run cleaner anyway. However, as we will see
below, technological neutrality is pervasive in our results.  Surprisingly,  more modem
technology seems to make no difference for environmental performance once we control
for other variables.
Finally, we are interested to note that plants which report greater indirect community
pressure (as opposed to formal regulatory pressure) don't exhibit greater environmental
effort than their counterparts.  Recent work on Southeast Asia (Pargal and Wheeler, 1996,
Hartman, Huq and Wheeler, 1996) has suggested that local community characteristics
such as income and education have a significant  effect on the environmental performance
of neighboring factories. Plentiful anecdotal evidence suggests that richer, more educated
communities can pressure factories to control pollution. However, the Asian research has
not been able to distinguish  between local actions which are 'formal' (i.e. part of local
regulatory procedures) and 'informal' (e.g., negotiations with community  groups).  The
12Mexican data are significantly  more detailed, and suggest that local influence  is working
principally  through local regulation.
Table 7:  First-Stage Regression Results
Variable  EMS  LABOR  MGT  TRAINING
SIZE  14.553  -0.685  0.305
(5.81)a  (3.082)  (2.586)




EMPHIGH  0.215  0.0075
(3.349)  (1.972)




CONSTANT  -20.810  -1.187  4.424
(3.485)  (3.829)  (4.368)
Adj.  R2 .40  .10  .18  .14
Observations  209  178  225  206
a t-statistics in parentheses
Variables which are significantly  associated with management effort include scale (at both
plant andfirm  levels), regulation and enforcement; general worker education; and  public
trading of the  firm 's stock.  The scale results are consistent with a lowering of unit costs
as lumpy environmental resources are spread across more units of activity. Regulation
and enforcement by national and local authorities seem to be making a difference in
Mexico. We attribute the significance  of worker education to greater efficiency  in
responding to new environmental incentives. Publicly-traded firms exhibit greater effort,
presumably because public information provides an additional incentive to improve
environmental performance.
An even smaller set of variables is significantly  associated with orientation toward
mainstreaming.  Scale has countervailing effects: Larger plants in multi-plant firms have
significantly  more environmental training for non-environmental  workers, but larger plants
also tend to assign environmental responsibility  to specialized managers. There is some
evidence that plants with prior experience of enforcement have more specialized
environmental managers, but this is not a strong result.
13Environmental Performance
Table 8 summarizes the results for our second-stage compliance equation.  Sample
observations are almost evenly split between compliant (48%) and non-compliant (52%)
facilities. The complete compliance equation includes the iour environmental management
indices; the educational level of workers in the factory (to control for differential efficiency
in achieving compliance); and three variables which serve as instruments for unobservable
abatement costs:  plant size, technology vintage, and sector. 5 In Table 8, we include only
variables which are significant  in at least some of our regression runs.
Table 8:  Second-Stage Probit Results
Variable  COMPLY
EMS (IV)  0.0284
_(3.449)
MGT (IV)  7.885
(3.265)








Surprisingly, our results suggest that assignment of more workers to environmental
monitoring and enforcement has no significant  effect. However, plants which have
adopted ISO-14000 procedures perform significantly  better, even after simultaneity effects
are purged.
Our results also suggest that mainstreaming  works: Better environmental performers
assign environmental responsibility  to general managers, and they provide environmental
training to non-environmental workers as well as environmental specialists. Interpretation
of this result depends on one's behavioral model. We believe that firms are experimenting
with a variety of approaches because environmental managernent is a new field in Mexico.
However, we recognize that some additional assumptions would make our results
consistent with a model of profit-maximizing  choice among well-known techniques.  As
we noted previously, environmental specialization  in training and management may be
cost-effective for plants whose environmental problems are technically complex,
concentrated at a few points, and separated from standard production processes.  If one
assumes that abatement costs are significantly  higher for such plants, then profit
5 See  Dasgupta,  et.  al., 1996.
14maximization dictates both more specialized management and lower average compliance
rates.  The result is a negative association between specialized management and
compliance, but it has nothing to do with experimentation.
Are abatement costs really higher for such plants? A priori, it is possible to construct
arguments for and against this proposition. We cannot test it with our data, and we are
not aware of any empirical  work on the issue.
Among the other variables in the complete compliance equation, only one sector dummy
(METAL) has any significant  effect.  Once we control for management effort and degree
of mainstreaming, we find that worker education, scale, and technology vintage do not
significantly  affect compliance. Of course, scale and worker education have indirect
effects through their impacts on ISO 14000 procedures and mainstreaming. By contrast,
technology vintage has no effect in either stage of the analysis.  This runs strongly counter
to the conventional wisdom, but the result seems reasonably robust.  As Table 9 shows,
our sample plants exhibit wide variation in the proportion of equipment installed since
1990. If there were a significant  effect, we would expect to observe it in such a highly-
varied sample.
Exogenous Determinants of Environmental Performance
The results in Tables 7 and 8 can be combined to yield some tentative conclusions about
the exogenous determinants of environmental performance in Mexican industry.  Through
their effect on adoption of ISO 14000 procedures, we find significant  effects for plant size,
multi-plant status, educated workers and recent experience with regulation. A few of our
exogenous variables also affect performance through their impact on mainstreaming.
Plant size has countervailing effects in this context: It encourages generalized
environmental training, but it also encourages specialized management. Experience of
recent regulation has a perverse, albeit weak, effect on performance through
encouragement of specialized management.  Firms which are publicly traded, on the other
hand, are significantly  more likely to train non-environmental  workers, with positive
consequences for environmental performance.
Table  9: Proportion  of plant  installed  since  1990
Frequency  %
0-20%  124  53.9
21-40%  33  14.4
41-60%  26  11.3
61-80%  13  5.6
81-100%  34  14.8
156.  Implications
Among the significant  determinants of environmental performance, we are interested in
iderntifying  the most influential  variables.  To measure relative impacts, we predict levels of
environrmental  management and compliance using low- and high-range values for the
significant  exogenous variables. Table 10 summarizes the values used for prediction.
Table 10:  Simulation Values for Exogenous Variables
SIZE  PUBLIC  EMPHIGH  MULTIDIV  RUL
Low  1  0  0  0  0
High  3  100  100  1  I
Figure 1 presents results for the determinants of EMS, the environmental management
index. On a scale of 0 to 100, we find that 'worst-case' plants have a predicted index
value of 14.  Such plants are small; not part of multi-plant firms; have no employees with
post-secondary education; and have experienced very weak regulation, if any. As we
substitute high values of the exogenous variables, the score improves progressively: by 17
for strong regulation; 22 for 100% post-secondary education; 29 for large size; and 16 for
ownership by a multi-plant firm. Plants with all the high-level  characteristics have a
predicted index value of 98: nearly complete implementation of an ISO 14000-type
environmental management system.  Although regulation clearly makes a difference, our
results suggest that a very large proportion of the difference between firms with weak and
strong EMS implementation is explained  by education and scale (at the plant and firm
levels).
Figure  1:  Relative Impact on Environmental Management
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16The impacts  of exogenous  variables  on EMS are of strong  interest,  because  our results
suggest  that internal  management  strategy  makes  a substantial  difference  for
environmental  performance. However,  a larger set of exogenous  variables  has an impact
on compliance  probability  through  the two training  variables. Figure  2 summarizes  the
total impact  of the exogenous  variables  on compliance. Within  our sample,  'worst-case'
plants  have  a predicted  compliance  probability  of about 12%,  while  'best-case' facilities
have  a 99% probability.  Figure  2 illustrates  the incremental  contributions:  Production  in
non-metals  sectors  adds 12%;  all shares  publicly  traded adds 6%; large  size 13%;  multi-
plant status 11%;  post-secondary  education  16%;  and strong  regulation  26%.  For
compliance,  strong  regulation  emerges  as the most important  variable.
Figure 2:  Relative Impact on Compliance Probability
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7.  Summary and Conclusions
In this paper, we have  used new survey  evidence  to analyze  the effects  of regulation,
environmental  management  policies,  and  plant/firm  characteristics  on the environmental
performance  of Mexican  factories. The results  of our two-stage  estimation  exercise  are
simple,  clear,  and relatively  consistent.  We can summarize  our principal  findings  as
follows:
(1) Process  is important.  Plants  which  institute  ISO 14000-type  internal  management
procedures  exhibit  superior  environmental  performance.
(2) Mainstreaming  works.  Environmental  training  for all plant personnel  is more
effective  than  developing  a cadre  of environmental  specialists;  assigning
environmental  tasks to general  managers  is more effective  than using  special
environmental  managers.
17(3) Regulatory  pressure  works. Plants  which  have experienced  regulatory  inspections
and enforcement are significantly  cleaner than their counterparts.
(4) Public  scrutiny  promotes  stronger  environmental  policies. Publicly-traded
Mexican  firms  are significantly  cleaner  than their  privately-held  counterparts.
(5) Size  matters. Large plants  in multi-plant  firms  are much  more  likely  to adopt  policies
which  improve  environmental  performance.
(6) OECD  influences  don't matter. Analyses  of pollutioln  control  in developing
countries  generally  assume  that plants  linked  to the OECD  economies  have  superior
environmental  performance.  However,  we do not find a significant  association  for any
OECD  linkage:  multinational  ownership,  trade, management  training,  or management
experience.
(7) New technology  isn't significantly  cleaner.  We find  no evidence  that plants  with
newer equipment have better environmental performance, once other factors are
accounted for.
(8) Education promotes clean  production. Plants with more highly-educated workers
have significantly  greater environmental management effort and performance.
Our results have some interesting implications for the World Bank and other development
assistance institutions. The significance  of our regulatory variables underscores the
importance of strengthened enforcement, which has been a traditional focus of technical
assistance projects. Stricter enforcement raises the price of pollution and provides  an
important incentive for pollution reduction.  However, our results also highlight the
potential of programs which promote more effective environmental management and
training within plants.  Such programs can increase the elasticity of industry's response to
regulation, and may in some cases provide very cost-effective complements to stricter
enforcement.
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20APPENDIX  1
Sample Distributions of Model Variables
Ownership: Publicly Traded/Privately Held
Number  %
Private  124  59.6
Mixed  14  6.7




Mexican  209  90.9
Multinational  21  9.1
Firm Type
Number  %
Single Plant  105  46.7
Multi-Plant  125  53.3
Reported Influence of Regulation
Number  %
Low  35  14.8
Medium  37  15.7
High  164  69.5
Prior Experience of Enforcement
Number  %
No  38  16.7
Yes  189  83.3
21Worker Education
% with
Secondary  Number  %
Education
0-  25  71  33.2
26 - 50  74  34.6
51-  75  26  12.1
76-  100  43  20.1
Distribution of Shipments to OECD, Mexico and other
Mean  SD  Max  Min
% ofsalesto  14.0  25.2  100  0
OECD
% ofsalesto  80.8  29.3  100  0
Mexico
% ofsalesto  5.2  12.5  100  0
Other  I  __  I  I_  _  I_  _  _  _
Managers with Secondary Education as the Highest Level of Education
Highest level of education  Frequency  %
Secondary  44  1
Other  226  98.3
OECD Experience of Person in Charge
Frequency 
Without  172  72.6
experience
With experience  65  27.4
22APPENDIX  2
ISO 14000  Standards  for Environmental  Management 6
Certification  by the International  Standards  Organization  (ISO) is considered  important  by
many firms seeking rapid growth in the international marketplace. Many leading
multinationals  attach a strong preference to subcontractors which have satisfied ISO
requirements, in particular the ISO 9000 series of quality control standards.  Although
only published in 1996, the ISO 14001 series of standards for Environmental Management
Systems (EMS) has already attracted significant  attention from industry.
Within the ISO 14001 series, some standards are still under negotiation. However, the
EMS standard has been finalized, and requires organizations seeking certification to take
the following steps:
*  An initial review by management to identify environmental issues of concern (e.g.
excessive  use of polluting inputs; the potential for a serious environmental accident);
*  Establishment of priorities for action, taking into account factors such as local
environmental  regulations and potential costs;
•  Establishment of an environmental policy statement, to be signed by the CEO, which
includes commitments to compliance  with environmental regulations, pollution
prevention and continuous improvement;
3  Development of performance targets based on the policy statement (e.g. reduction of
emissions by a set amount over a defined period);
*  Implementation of the EMS, with defined procedures and responsibilities;
*  Implementation  reviews, performance measurement, and management audits.
Although new, ISO 14001 is already having a significant  impact on the environmental
stance of firms in both industrial and developing countries. In Europe, businesses are
rapidly adopting an Eco-Management and Audit Regulation (EMAR) established by the
European Union, which incorporates the ISO 14001 principles, plus requirements that
firms comply with environmental legislation and publicly report their environmental
performance. To remain competitive in Europe, many Japanese companies are
aggressively pursuing ISO 14001 certification, and a number of US firms have followed
suit.
ISO 14001 is also receiving significant  attention in developing countries. Early in 1997,
Altos Hornos de Mdxico was the first Mexican company to be certified to ISO 14001 for
part of its operations.  Since then, it has been followed by a number of major Mexican
facilities, both domestic and foreign-owned. The interest in EMS has extended to
Mexico's Environment Ministry (SEMARNAP), which has incorporated a voluntary EMS
into its regulatory system. To promote adoption, SEMARNAP will establish a set of
6  Our thanks to Paul Martin for extensive comments on a previous draft of this Appendix, and to Richard
Wells  of  The  Lexington  Group  for  very  useful  discussion  of ISO  14001  standards.
23incentives  such  as accelerated  depreciation  on environmental  equipment  and  eligibility  for
simplified  licensing  procedures. In Asia, both Indonesia  and  Philippines  intend  to
incorporate  ISO 14001  elements  into their  new programs  for public  disclosure  of firms'
environmental perfonrance.
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